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AbstrAct
After the restoration of independence in August 1991, Estonia had no national 
defence, defence capability or capacity for international defence cooperation. The 
armed forced had to be ‘invented’. However, this can be regarded as an advantage, 
since retraining and reorganising an existing system is usually more difficult. 
The main principles of national defence were established in Chapter 10 of the 
Constitution, which was approved in a referendum held in June 1992. This chap-
ter, which was influenced by the presidential constitution of 1937/1938, did not 
answer the question of whether the Commander of the Defence Forces would 
be placed under the authority of the President, the parliament or the govern-
ment. Two voluntary national defence organisations, the Defence League and the 
Home Guard, which competed with each other, already existed in Estonia when 
the Defence Forces were established. The Ministry of Defence was established 
even later. There were fears that subordinating the Commander of the Defence 
Forces to the government may lead to the politicisation of the army and uneven 
development due to frequent changes of government. These problems were eased 
by subordinating the commander to the President – however, this caused ten-
sion between the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces Headquarters. 
The parliament had the right to appoint and remove the Commander of the 
Defence Forces, but the proposal had to come from the President. This conflict 
culminated in summer 2000 when the Commander of the Defence Forces was 
removed as a result of a vote in the Riigikogu, which the President called an issue 
of civilian control; the removal, as well as the Defence Minister and government 
keeping their positions, was decided by one vote, allegedly given by accident… 
176 Hellar Lill
The Constitution was amended in 2011. The President remains the highest leader 
of national defence, but executive power in the leadership of national defence has 
been granted to the government.
Introduction
After regaining independence in 1991, Estonia initially lacked any 
national defence structures and even the basic capacity for self-defence, 
let alone international defence cooperation. The armed forces of the inde-
pendent state had to be “reinvented” or built from scratch. This can also 
be considered an advantage, given that the comprehensive reforming and 
retraining of an existing system is usually a complicated task. There were 
no legislations governing defence and no armament, national military 
personnel, training system or other factors critical to national defence. 
National defence traditions to be relied upon dated back to the pre-World 
War II period and were important in terms of conveyance of values, as 
well as ceremonies and rituals, etc., but not necessarily relevant in the 
context of building up a defence suitable for a small independent state. 
Moreover, the nostalgic aspect could even have an inhibitory effect on the 
organisation of modern national defence.
When the development of national defence was started in Estonia, 
people had a lot of good will and enthusiasm to get things done, but the 
relevant skills and knowledge were limited. There was no experience of 
organising national defence in the country. The principles of national 
defence were sought to be formulated in Chapter 10 ‘National Defence’ 
of the Constitution drafted by the Constitutional Assembly and approved 
by referendum in summer 1992. The Constitution gave rise to a major 
conflict that affected the development of national defence for two decades 
after the restoration of independence due to the ambiguous and contra-
dictory wording regarding the leadership of national defence. Simply put, 
the question was: who is the Commander of the Defence Forces sub-
ordinate to?
Following the amendment to the Constitution which was approved 
by the Parliament in April 2011 and entered into force on the 22nd of July 
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the same year1 and by which the problematic provision of the Constitu-
tion was changed, it is appropriate to make a brief retrospect of how the 
problem came into being, what the causes were and how solutions to it 
were sought, given that all this constituted a separate chapter in the devel-
opment of national defence in Estonia.
Background
The first years of the development of national defence after Estonia 
regained its independence have been metaphorically referred to as the 
period of an “adventure film” or “people’s theatre” in which the actors did 
what they deemed fit to build up the primary defence capacity and coun-
terbalance the foreign troops that were still present in the country. Despite 
the proposals published in some newspaper articles and set out in offi-
cial documents (by Rein Helme, Ants Laaneots and Hannes Walter)2 and 
the first relevant discussions, Estonia initially lacked an official defence 
concept or doctrine formulating the principles of national defence. The 
principles of the defence concept are considered to have been presented 
for the first time and in the most concise way in the ‘National Defence’ 
chapter of the Constitution; the fundamental principles set out there were 
gradually supplemented in various acts of law on national defence.3 Thus, 
the Constitution certainly had a significant impact on the overall national 
defence-related thinking in subsequent years.
The development of national defence was characterised by an acute 
shortage of people with relevant knowledge and experience. There were a 
number of enthusiastic and diligent people from different backgrounds – 
former Soviet army officers, officers who had served in the armed forces 
of Western countries, as well as some men with experience from the Esto-
nian Defence Forces in the pre-World War II period, and a few officers 
1 “Act Amending the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia,” RT I, 27.4.2011, 1.
2 See: Hellar Lill, “Eesti riigikaitsepoliitika kujunemisest. Esimesed visioonid 1991–1995,” 
Akadeemia 9 (2009), 1740–1751.
3 Rein Helme, “Uus hüsteeria kaitsekontseptsiooni ümber,” Eesti Aeg, 30.8.1995.
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who had fought in different armies during World War II. In spring 1992, 
the names of 421 regular officers of Estonian descent were ascertained, 
16 of them from Western countries. Around 60 of them were involved in 
the creation of the Estonian Defence Forces.4
The shortage of civilians with an appropriate background and expe-
rience was even more acute. Also, the officers were usually servicemen 
with varying level of training and experience from several different (and 
mostly large) countries, and thus had to adjust to the national defence of 
the small independent state. There were no people with knowledge of the 
higher strategic level, where, figuratively speaking, the state and the army 
meet. Ants Laaneots, the then Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces, has 
said:5 “In the early years, the creation and development of the Defence 
Forces was only possible thanks to the fanatical and often self-sacrificing 
work of a small number of military enthusiasts”.6
Formulation of the Constitution’s ‘National Defence’ 
chapter and reasons for this
“It is with some bewilderment that I recently read in a newspaper that 
the Prime Minister has taken upon himself the task of governing national 
defence and has committed to fill the security vacuum with the help of our 
partner countries. Once again I am forced to recall the simple principle: it 
is common in Estonia to have one President at a time. Let’s draw the line 
4 Urmet Kook, “Ants Laaneots: rahvuslik ohvitserkond “saab valmis” 10 aasta pärast,” Riigi 
Kaitse (Eesti Päevaleht), 28.9.2004.
5 General Ants Laaneots was the Chief of Staff of the Estonian Defence Forces from 1991–
1994 and 1997–1999 and the Commander of the Defence Forces from 2006–2011. He was 
promoted to Colonel in 1992, Major General in 1998, Lieutenant General in 2008 and General 
in 2011.
6 Ants Laaneots, “Eesti Kaitsejõud aastail 1991–2011,” – Kakskümmend aastat taasiseseis-
vust Eestis, 1991–2011: ettekannete kokkuvõtted teaduskonverentsil “20 aastat taasiseseisvust 
Eestis, 1991–2011” 20. augustil 2011 Tallinnas = Twenty years of restored statehood in Estonia, 
1991–2011: the proceedings of scientific conference “20 years of restored statehood in Estonia, 
1991–2011,” 20 August 2011, Tallinn, koostaja ja peatoimetaja Leili Utno (Tallinn: Välis-Eesti 
Ühing, 2011), 175.
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here.”7 It is safe to say that the penultimate sentence of this quotation from 
1993, which has even been used in a song, is the best-known statement of 
President Lennart Meri and its original context is not really remembered 
or acknowledged – as is often the case with quotations. The quotation is a 
vivid example of the interpretation problems and disputes concerning the 
governance of national defence in the 1990s and partly also in the next 
decade, which directly stemmed from the concept of national defence 
provided in the Constitution. The distribution of authority for the gover-
nance of national defence and more specifically the question of the sub-
ordination of the Commander of the Defence Forces has been regarded 
as the most problematic issue arising from the Constitution in the field of 
national defence. Constitutional disputes over the institutional roles and 
powers of the President and the Government resulted from the fact that, 
on the one hand, the Constitution appointed the President as the supreme 
commander of national defence, while, on the other hand, it stated that 
the executive power was vested in the Government and that the Parlia-
ment had the right to appoint the Commander of the Defence Forces.8 
Thus the Constitution sought to accommodate the national defence 
model of a presidential state in the context of a parliamentary state.9
The main features of the future principles of national defence were 
outlined during the discussions and debates of the Constitutional Assem-
bly, which was composed of the members of the Supreme Council and the 
Estonian Congress and which acted from the 13th of September 1991 to 
the 10th of April 1992 and held a total of 30 sessions.10 The Constitution 
was approved by referendum on the 28th of  June 1992. The Constitu-
tion, in particular its Chapter 10, is definitely the most important legal 
7 Speech of the President of the Republic at the threshold of the second year of his term 
of office in Estonian Television, 7 October 1993, http://vp1992-2001.president.ee/est/k6ned/
K6ne.asp?ID=4238 (accessed 18.11.2011).
8 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia before the amendment that entered into force on 22 
July 2011.
9 Märt Rask’s interview to Urmas Ott, 4 December 2001 – Põhiseaduse tulek, koostaja ja toi-
metaja Eve Pärnaste, koostaja-konsultant Ülle Aaskivi, intervjuude autorid Urmas Ott ja Inge 
Rumessen (Tallinn: SE&JS, 2002), 247.
10 Põhiseaduse tulek, 50–72.
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source that determines the bases of national defence. As regards national 
defence-related legislation and a fixed conceptual basis in the first years 
of restored independence, it is actually possible to talk only about Chap-
ter 10 of the Constitution, as other relevant documents were only slowly 
beginning to emerge.
Also Ülo Uluots,11 the first Minister of Defence after the restoration 
of independence, referred to a lack of clarity in governance in his political 
testament issued at the end of his term of office, in which he stated that the 
Defence Forces and the Defence League were not subordinate to the Min-
istry of Defence and that the Minister of Defence could issue only requests, 
not orders, to the Commander of the Defence Forces.12 In his interview to 
Päevaleht in October 1992 Ants Laaneots, who was fulfilling the tasks of 
both the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces and the Commander of the 
Defence Forces, unequivocally confirmed his direct subordination to the 
President: “The Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces is subordinate to the 
President, as Lennart Meri, the Head of State, also confirmed at the meet-
ing. As the Commander of the Defence Forces has not been appointed yet, 
I am fulfilling these tasks in accordance with the statutes of the Defence 
Forces Headquarters. I report directly to the President.”13 This raises the 
question whether the wording of the Constitution would also have allowed 
for a different interpretation in practice. However, subsequent relations 
largely relied on the original interpretation and the powers and subordina-
tion initially enforced. One can speculate whether many dissentions could 
have been avoided or mitigated if the National Defence Council, which 
includes both the Minister of Defence and the Commander of the Defence 
Forces and in which personal interaction would have enabled relations to 
be put in place a reasonable way, would have started work immediately. An 
important role was also played by the powerful personality of President 
Lennart Meri who – as is evident from the above quotations – interpreted 
the Constitution precisely in this way.
11 Ülo Uluots was the Minister of Defence in the first Government of Tiit Vähi from 18 June 
1991 to 21 October 1992.
12 Ülo Uluots, “Poliitiline testament,” 1992, KMA 1/18, 10.
13 Sulev Hallik, “Kolonel Laaneots: Meie rahvas ei ole sissisõjaks valmis,” Päevaleht, 31.10.1992.
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President of Estonia Lennart Meri (on the right) and Defence Minister Andrus 
Öövel attach lieutenant general’s shoulder marks to Commander  
of Defence Forces Aleksander Einseln (1995). Lembit Michelson /ETA/
Estonian Film Archives
When thinking about the reasons behind the development of the 
wording of the ‘National Defence’ chapter of the Constitution, two 
aspects, in particular, should be addressed.
First, when describing the development of the leadership as stated 
in the Constitution, it should be admitted that the Constitution as such 
reflects a certain socio-political and socio-economic situation in society.14 
Undoubtedly, this points to the then political situation in which Estonia 
actually had two armed voluntary organisations that competed against 
each other: the Defence League and the Home Guard. In addition, it was 
feared that the Defence Forces to be created could be politicised by execu-
tive power, which is why it was sought to counterbalance this possibil-
ity by strengthening the role of the President in national defence. It was 
14 Rait Maruste, Anneli Albi, “Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus Euroopa Liidu õiguskorras,” Juridica 
I (2003): 3–7.
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feared that if the Commander of the Defence Forces were made directly 
subordinate to the Government, the Defence Forces would not be able to 
function normally due to rapid changes of the Governments.15 The fears 
concerning the functioning of the principles of democratic governance of 
national defence in the first years after the restoration of independence 
are illustrated by the questions posed by Tönu Parming in an article on 
national defence issues in the collection titled Pontes Novi in 1995: “For 
example, how strong is civilian control over the armed forces in a situa-
tion where it has not been decided whether the Defence Forces are actu-
ally subordinate to the President or, through the Minister of Defence, to 
the Government? How firm is civilian control over the armed forces in a 
situation where the Commander of the Defence Forces basically refused 
to talk with the Government for a long time and has publicly named min-
isters crooks? And where the only General [of Estonia] states in an inter-
view published in foreign media that certain persons and entities have 
suggested that he should take the helm of the state?”16 The initial wording 
of the Constitution has also been explained by fears of potential undemo-
cratic power ambitions of a then political leader. The same article by Tönu 
Parming contains a reference to worries concerning the authoritarianism 
of Edgar Savisaar in 1995: “[---] exceptionally strong and – compared to 
NATO member states – large armed formations are subordinate to the 
Minister of the Interior with an authoritarian disposition. Anyhow, Edgar 
Savisaar has more “guns and bayonets” (as was said in the old days) than 
Major General Aleksander Einseln.”17, 18
Second, when drafting, discussing and adopting the Constitution, 
the Constitutional Assembly faced a complex challenge as regards the 
15 Põhiseadus ja Põhiseaduse Assamblee, toim. Viljar Peep (Tallinn: Juura, 1997), 305–306.
16 Tönu Parming, “NATO, Eesti ja sõjastrateegilisi küsimusi Läänemere ruumis,” – Pontes 
Novi: Eesti Üliõpilaste Seltsi ja Helsingi Ülikooli põhjala osakondade ühisväljaanne, toimkond: 
Timo Höykinpuro jt (Tartu: Eesti Üliõpilaste Seltsi Kirjastus, 1995), 119.
17 Ibid., 119–120.
18 The first quotation refers to the statements of Aleksander Einseln who was the Commander 
of the Defence Forces from 4 May 1993 to 4 December 1995, and the second quotation refers 
to the period when Edgar Savisaar was the Minister of the Interior in the Government of Tiit 
Vähi from 12 April to 10 October 1995 and controlled police and border guard units.
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regulation of national defence issues, because, unlike a number of other 
areas, Estonia then lacked any relevant relations or arrangements in the 
sphere of national defence that could be relied upon. According to Jüri 
Adams, a member of the Constitutional Assembly, it was unclear what 
the future national defence of Estonia would look like and thus it was not 
possible to address national defence issues in the Constitution in detail.19 
A similar view has been supported by Jüri Luik who has said that the 
authors of the ‘National Defence’ chapter of the Constitution were not 
aware what the national defence system of an independent state means 
or how national defence should actually be governed with such system.20 
This has been explained by the fact that, when developing the national 
defence governance system and defining the subordination relationships, 
the Constitutional Assembly and its working party dealing with issues of 
national defence guided themselves by the Estonian Constitution of 1938, 
which provided for the appointment of the Commander or Commander-
in-Chief of the armed forces by the President of the Republic.21 The ways 
of thinking could also have been affected by the general national defence 
practice prevailing in the Republic of Estonia before World War II, whereby 
the Minister of Defence was a relatively marginal figure compared to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces or the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces, as well as by the significant personal authority of 
General Johan Laidoner, a hero of the War of Independence who served as 
the Commander-in-Chief in the years 1918–1920, 1924–1925 and 1934–
1940.22 In its final report the expert panel on the Constitution concluded 
that “neither the Constitutional Assembly’s working party for national 
19 Põhiseadus, 142.
20 Mart Soidro, “Kaitseminister Jüri Luik: Me oleme kaitseväes liialt julgelt kasutanud pika 
nõukogude-taustaga inimesi,” Keskus, 26.6.2002.
21 The presidential constitution that came into force on 1 January 1938 set up the institution of 
the President of the Republic with large-scale powers and the right to appoint the Commander 
and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The bicameral Parliament was composed 
of the lower house, which was elected, and the upper house, which was appointed by the Presi-
dent. Because of the state of national emergency, the official title of the head of the armed forces 
was Commander-in-Chief until the de facto end of the existence of the Republic of Estonia.
22 Merle Maigre, “Tsiviil-militaarsuhted Eestis,” Diplomaatia 38, November (2006).
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defence nor the members of the Constitutional Assembly had an entirely 
clear idea of the scope of authority that this general clause (appointing the 
President as the supreme commander of national defence) was expected 
to entail.”23 Rein Helme who was the chairman of the National Defence 
Committee of the Parliament from 1992–1995 criticised the Constitu-
tional Assembly for its excessive nostalgia for the Constitution of 1938 in 
the context of regulating national defence matters, figuratively describing 
the conflict of authority in the governance of national defence as follows: 
“So, the current situation is such that, if one of two best friends would 
tomorrow be appointed as the  Minister of Defence and the other as the 
Commander of the Defence Forces, their friendship would certainly be 
over, however good-natured or wise they are.”24
As the possible third aspect, Vello Saatpalu, a member of the Consti-
tutional Assembly, pointed to an argumentum ad hominem aspect already 
in 1992, stating that the inclusion of the President in the Constitution as 
the supreme commander of national defence “is certainly on the con-
science of those who, being the advocates of a presidential state, could 
not accept their defeat and literally used every chance they had to plant 
provisions into the Constitution of Estonia, which will have to be kept in 
mind during the forthcoming arrangement of the Constitution.”25 Saa-
tpalu’s explanation is not likely, however; the wording probably resulted 
from a combined effect of the two abovementioned reasons.
Interpretations and effects of the Constitution’s 
‘National Defence’ chapter
As a result of the two aspects described above, the approach to the gov-
ernance of national defence was formulated in the Constitution in a 
contradictory manner, and the attempt to combine the elements of two 
23 Final report of the expert panel on the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, http://www.
just.ee/10738 (accessed 18.11.2012).
24 Rein Helme, “Väheseadustatud Riigikaitse,” Postimees, 15.1.2000.
25 Vello Saatpalu, “Seekord aitab,” Postimees, 11.12.1992.
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different systems of government has to be regarded as failed. Disputes 
over the governance problem reached a milestone in the ruling of the 
Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court in 1994, which 
stated that the situation where the President of the Republic gives orders 
to the Commander of the Defence Forces, bypassing the Government of 
the Republic, is not in line with the spirit of the Constitution.26 This rul-
ing was prompted by the Peacetime National Defence Act approved by 
the Parliament and sent by President Lennart Meri to the Constitutional 
Review Chamber of the Supreme Court.
In accordance with the proposal of the Constitutional Review Cham-
ber of the Supreme Court, the Government of the Republic set up an 
expert panel for legal assessment of the Constitution in 1996. In 1997, 
26 See: Lauri Almann, “Riigikaitse õiguslik korraldus – põhijooned ja arengud,” Riigi Kaitse 
(Eesti Päevaleht), 2.6.2006.
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of national defence after 
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the pre-WWII Estonian national 
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the report of the expert panel was published, which, on the one hand, 
admitted that national defence was “more or less” sufficiently regulated in 
the Constitution.27 On the other hand, the report stated that the inconsis-
tency stemming from the authority conflict described above was directly 
inhibiting the development of the Defence Forces, causing subordination 
and authority conflicts and preventing the establishment of normal coop-
eration between the two central bodies governing national defence – the 
Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces Headquarters.28 An impor-
tant conclusion was that the appointment of the President as the supreme 
commander of national defence involved a threat of double governance at 
the highest level of the chain of command. The appointment of the Com-
mander of the Defence Forces by the Parliament gave the Commander an 
unreasonably strong position alongside the Minister of Defence, and quite 
similar legal status. The committee recommended the elimination of the 
empty and confusing wording of section 127 of the Constitution, which 
appointed the President of the Republic as the supreme commander of 
national defence, and amending section 127 of the Constitution as fol-
lows: “The Government of the Republic shall ensure external security of the 
state and govern national defence on the basis of law. The Prime Minister 
shall form the National Security Council pursuant to the procedure pro-
vided by law. During a state of war, the Defence Forces shall be subordinate 
to the Prime Minister.”29 It was also found that this governance system 
does not require the legitimisation of the institution of the Commander 
of the Defence Forces in the Constitution.30
One must admit that despite attempts to mitigate it, the conflict of 
authority had a suppressive effect on the development of national defence 
through the 1990s, giving both the Commander of the Defence Forces 
and the Minister of Defence opportunities to interpret the relationship of 
subordination differently and, in case of problems, refer to the omissions 
on the part of the other. The explanatory memorandum to the amend-
27 Final report.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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ment of the Constitution of 2011 stated that “most of the political prob-
lems relating to the Defence Forces which have arisen after the restoration 
of independence and adoption of the Constitution pertain to the unclear 
civilian control of the Defence Forces.”31 
The confusion in the distribution of authority created a negative 
background for the development and organisation of national defence 
by the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces Headquarters, creat-
ing uncertainty in the formulation of doctrines and planning of national 
defence, and in balancing self-defence capacity with collective defence. It 
has been suggested that, in addition to the official national defence plan-
31 Explanatory memorandum to the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Esto-
nia, 27 April 2011, http://www.riigikogu.ee/?page=eelnou&op=ems&eid=1325102&emshelp=
true&u=20110409232849 (accessed 14.4.2012).
President of Estonia Lennart Meri at the presidential palace Kadriorg on 
the day he took the oath of office. On the right Chief of Staff of the Estonian 
Defence Forces Colonel Ants Laaneots, who according to contemporary view 
was subordinated directly to the President (6 October 1992). Tiit Veermäe/
ETA/Estonian Film Archives
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ning, there was also secondary double-planning, which was made pos-
sible due to the authority conflict and a lack of democratic governance 
practices in national defence. Margus Kolga, Deputy Undersecretary for 
the Defence Policy of the Ministry of Defence in charge of integration 
with NATO, later admitted: “Although the planning documents submit-
ted to NATO were signed by both the Minister and the Commander of 
the Defence Forces, their contents were all too often not reflected in the 
planning documents of the Defence Forces and, even worse, the Defence 
Forces were engaged in entirely other matters.”32
The unclear technical and legal subordination definitely was not the 
only issue. As the above example shows, there was also a question of the 
authority and credibility of the Minister and the Ministry. The fact that the 
Defence Forces as an institution were restored earlier than the Ministry of 
Defence also played a role.33 Ants Laaneots has stated: “A peculiar feature 
of the recreation of national defence was the fact that Estonia lacked the 
Ministry and the Minister of Defence for a long time.”34 He has explained 
that the Defence Forces Headquarters then had to deal with security and 
defence policy-related activities not typical for such an institution, as pub-
lic authorities whose duties cover such activities simply did not exist.35
The conflict between the Commander of the Defence Forces and the 
Minister of Defence culminated with the so-called “battle of directives” in 
1997, when Andrus Öövel, the Minister of Defence,36 and Johannes Kert, 
the Commander of the Defence Forces,37 issued contradictory and mutu-
ally exclusive directives on issues concerning the provision of military 
32 Margus Kolga, “Mis siis ikkagi kaitseväes toimub?” Eesti Päevaleht, 7.11.2006.
33 The Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia decided to establish the Defence Forces on 
3 September 1991. The Defence Forces Headquarters was re-established on 31 October 1991, 
the Ministry of Defence on 13 April 1992, and Ülo Uluots was appointed Defence Minister on 
18 July 1992.
34 Laaneots, “Eesti Kaitsejõud,” 175.
35 Ants Laaneots, Eesti Vabariigi julgeolekukontseptsiooni areng aastail 1991–1994 ja kõrg-
koolid: aulaloeng 8. veebruaril 1996 (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 1996), 5–6.
36 Andrus Öövel was the Minister of Defence in the Governments of Tiit Vähi and Mart 
Siiman from 17 April 1995 to 25 March 1999.
37 Johannes Kert was the Commander of the Defence Forces from 1996–2000. He was pro-
moted to Lieutenant General in 1998.
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The leadership structure of national defence from year 1996. The Commander 
of Defence Forces was subordinated to the President as well as to the Ministry 
of Defence. Eesti Kaitsejõud 1991–1996. Tallinn: Kaitseministeerium, 
Kaitsejõudude Peastaap, 1996
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the Government of the republic
education. Namely, instead of the military school that had been operating 
within the National Defence Academy of Estonia, a new military school 
was founded on the order of the Defence Forces Headquarters on the 
9th of June 1997, and the admission of cadets was announced. Minister 
Öövel, in turn, revoked that document.38 Johannes Kert, the Commander 
of the Defence Forces, then sent a letter to Öövel, declaring his refusal 
to publish the Minister’s directive and to order the Defence Forces, the 
Defence League and the educational institutions of the Defence Forces 
to comply with it. On the 14th of July Kert issued a new directive order-
ing the establishment of a military school, a higher military school and a 
staff college within the training centre of the National Defence College. 
In turn, Öövel issued a directive on the 31st of July revoking the directive 
38 Directive no 108 of the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, 30 June 1997, KMA 
7, 9–10.
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of the Commander of the Defence Forces of the 14th of July, indicating 
that it was incompatible with both the Education Act and the Vocational 
Educational Institutions Act.39
To solve this situation, it was suggested that one of the men should 
resign. According to the expert panel on the Constitution, the resigna-
tion would not have solved the situation and the methods of resolving 
the conflict between the Commander of the Defence Forces and the Min-
ister of Defence were inadequate due to the deficiencies of the legal reg-
ulation.40 Eerik-Juhan Truuväli, the Chancellor of Justice, had to admit 
that he failed to see how vertical subordination could be created between 
the institutions of the Minister of Defence and the Commander of the 
Defence Forces. Yet he also acknowledged that the Commander of the 
Defence Forces could not issue a directive which the Minister of Defence 
did not agree with.41
It is true that the interpretation of the formal relationship between 
the Commander of the Defence Forces and the Minister of Defence was 
greatly influenced by the personal compatibility and relations between 
the persons. For example, Hain Rebas,42 a reserve officer of Swedish Army 
and a professor of history at the University of Kiel who was the Minister 
of Defence in the government of Mart Laar, and Ants Laaneots, a former 
officer of the Soviet Army who, being the Chief of Staff of the Defence 
Forces, fulfilled the tasks of the Commander of the Defence Forces, 
quickly found a common language with each other.43 However, the period 
during which they worked together was relatively short.
As the Parliament had the authority to appoint and release the Com-
mander of the Defence Forces, the appointment and release became a 
39 Aivar Jarne, “Käskkirjade lahing Ööveli ja Kerdi vahel,” Postimees, 24.9.1997.
40 Final report.
41 Toomas Mattson, “Õiguskantsler möönab pädevusvastuolusid,” Postimees, 26.9.1997.
42 Hain Rebas was the Minister of Defence in the Government of Mart Laar from 21 October 
1992 to 5 August 1993.
43 Hain Rebas, “Meenutus Laari esimesest valitsusest: riigikaitse korralik läbikukkumine,” 
Delfi, 21.10.2012, http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/arvamus/hain-rebase-meenutus-
laari-esimesest-valitsusest-eesti-riigikaitse-korralik-labikukkumine.d?id=65143122 (accessed 
2.4.2014).
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subject of internal political struggle. The release of General Aleksander 
Einseln from the post of the Commander of the Defence Forces in 1995 
was justified, inter alia, by his political statements. During the discussion 
of the relevant draft Act on the 19th of December, his release was also 
referred to as “political lynching”.44
The voting on the draft Act on the release of Lieutenant General 
Johannes Kert from the post of the Commander of the Defence Forces 
in the Parliament on the 28th of August 2000 turned into a political vote. 
Even President Lennart Meri made  a political statement in the Parliament, 
pointing to the need to depoliticise the post of the Commander of the 
Defence Forces and to Kert’s behaviour that allegedly had not been consis-
tent with the principles of civilian control among the reasons for releasing 
Kert from the post. Indeed, Meri viewed the vote on the release from the 
post as a question of civilian control.45 Interestingly, the final outcome of 
the vote and Kert’s release was determined by a supposedly accidental vote 
in favour by Tõnu Kauba, a member of the Centre Party faction, who had 
allegedly played with the voting button and thus voted differently from 
the rest of the faction (and got later expelled from the faction). In a way, it 
was a vote of confidence for the Government and the Minister of Defence 
which, in the case of Kert staying in office, would most likely have led to 
the resignation of Jüri Luik, the Minister of Defence.
Summary
The wording of the ‘National Defence’ chapter of the Constitution 
resulted from the shortage of know-how and the prevailing political situ-
ation and began to influence the development of national defence due to 
44 Verbatim report of the 2nd Session of the 8th Parliament, 19 December 1995, http://www.
riigikogu.ee/?op=steno&stcommand=stenogramm&date=819360000&pkpkaupa=1&paevak
ord=1900002852 (accessed 24.10.2013).
45 Verbatim report of the Extraordinary Session of the 8th Parliament, 28 August 2000, http://
www.riigikogu.ee/?op=steno&stcommand=stenogramm&date=967468680#pk2000006887 
(accessed 1.11.2013).
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the  conflict thus programmed into the interactions between two lead-
ing institutions. The conflict of authority that had arisen from the word-
ing of the Constitution and its interpretations affected the development 
of national defence directly, in specific controversial issues, as well as in 
a more general and indirect manner. The confusion in the distribution 
of authority and the different interpretations of the relationship of sub-
ordination created a negative background for the development of the 
national defence. This conflict of authority could probably have been mit-
igated in its initial phase, had there been sufficient personal communica-
tion and a will to interpret the Constitution differently. Through a vari-
ety of instruments and “testing of the limits”, the problem was mitigated 
and sorted out clearly enough to ensure that the conflict would not be 
an obstacle to the credible explanation of the governance of our national 
defence in the accession negotiations with NATO. An important role was 
played by the gradual development and entrenchment of understanding 
of the principles of democratic governance of national defence in Estonia, 
which contributed to the search for solutions.
What historian Ago Pajur wrote about the national defence policy of 
the first period of independence can also be applied to the more recent 
history of national defence: “The concept of national defence determines 
both the general attitudes of society towards the necessity and importance 
of protecting statehood and the specific areas and directions of action of 
authorities in charge of security policy and national defence. The gen-
esis of national defence policy thinking is closely linked to the prepara-
tion and adoption of decisions of fundamental significance to national 
defence – on the one hand, the adoption of such decisions depends on 
the level of development of political thinking, but on the other hand these 
decisions serve as the basis for the organisation of national defence in 
practice.”46 The ‘National Defence’ chapter of the Constitution can thus be 
interpreted as a significant part of the concept of national defence, which 
placed the authorities organising national defence in a difficult situation 
due to the unclear governance model.
46 Ago Pajur, Eesti riigikaitsepoliitika aastail 1918–1934 (Tartu: Eesti Ajalooarhiiv 1999), 9.
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While in 1997 the expert panel on the Constitution had recommended 
deleting the provision that appointed the President as the supreme com-
mander of national defence, the amendment that entered into force in 
2011 only omitted the third paragraph of the section, which discussed 
the status of the Commander and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence 
Forces and the procedure for appointing them to office and releasing 
from office.47 The function of governing national defence was unambigu-
ously assigned to the Government of the Republic and thus subordinated 
to executive power, which is consistent with the constitutional order of 
Estonia.
In the context of the governance and recent history of national 
defence, it was a small “end of history” – a tense phase clearly came to its 
end. The verse added to a well-known folk song during the years of Soviet 
occupation, “I would like to be at home when Päts is the President, Laid-
oner commands the army and kroon is the national currency”, marked nos-
talgia for the way of life and the organisation of the state in the Republic 
of Estonia before World War II. It could now be stated that while after the 
restoration of independence it was relatively quickly realised that the role 
of the Head of State has fundamentally changed compared to the pre-war 
period, the final breakdown of the paradigm of national defence thinking 
“Laidoner commands the army” and the amendment of the Constitution 
took nearly two decades and materialised only after the kroon was no 
longer the national currency, with Estonia joining the euro zone on the 
1st of January 2011.
47 “Act Amending the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia,” RT I, 27.4.2011, 1.
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